The basic question that Economics deals with is how to "best" allocate scarce resources. The basic answer is that trade can improve everyone's welfare, and will lead to a market equilibrium: a vector of resource prices that "clear the market" and lead to an efficient allocation. Indeed, Arrow and Debreu and much further work show that such market equilibria exist in general settings.
dles of items. The usual notion of price-based equilibrium in this model is called a Walrasian equilibrium, but these only rarely exist -exactly when the associated integer program has no integrality gap. We analyze this market situation as a game where each player announces a bid for each item and the high bidder on each item gets it and pays his bid. We present the following results in this setting:
• Walrasian equilibria of the associated market are in 1-1 correspondence with pure Nash equilibria of the associated game. In particular, pure equilibria always maximize social welfare (a "first welfare theorem").
• While existence of mixed Nash equilibria is not trivial since buyers have a continuum of strategies and discontinuous utilities, we show that they do exist (for some tie breaking rule). We consider several basic cases that do not have any price equilibrium and find mixed Nash equilibria for them.
• We analyze the social welfare achieved by mixed Nash equilibria. We exhibit examples with a loss ("price of anarchy") factor of Ω( √ m), bound the loss by O(m) in general, and by a factor of 2 for the sub-modular case. This is also generalized to Bayesian settings. 
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